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Introduction 
Every year the American Library Association’s Office for Intellectual Freedom (OIF) 
collects statistics for books that have been challenged in libraries across the United States.  The 
reasons for the challenges run the gamut from sexuality to political content.  One reason that has 
been cited many times over the years by librarians that report the challenges is “religion.” In 
some respects, it is difficult to know how this reason for challenging books is defined.  For 
example, at the height of its popularity, the Harry Potter series was challenged for including 
witchcraft.  There are several versus in the Bible that condemn witchcraft (Deuteronomy 18:10; 
Galatians 5:20) and these challenges could be interpreted as “religious” challenges.  In another 
example, The Da Vinci Code was challenged by Catholic sources for its “blasphemous nature” 
(Karolides, Bald, and Sova 2011, 221).   In her reference book Banned Books: Literature 
Suppressed on Religious Grounds, Margaret Bald discusses the suppression histories of books as 
varied as Oliver Twist and the Bible (Bald 2006).  Although the books that Bald catalogs are 
challenged for different reasons that range from promotion of evolution to blasphemy, they can 
all be classified as “religious.”  However, it should be noted that these varied explanations make 
it problematic to discuss religion as it relates to intellectual freedom. 
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 If religion is defined narrowly, the United States is becoming a much less religious nation 
in the 21
st
 century.  According to the most recent Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life survey, 
16.1% of Americans state that they have no religious affiliation 
(http://religions.pewforum.org/affiliations).  Although the survey accounts for many different 
types of religious beliefs (Christian, Agnostic, Hindu), this chapter will argue that this is a 
narrow construction of religion based on a conceptualization of the term that associates 
religiosity with organized religious practices. In order to have a less antagonistic relationship—
as exemplified by the challenges given above—between religion and intellectual freedom, it is 
necessary to have more expansive definitions of both concepts.  
 This chapter argues that the relationship between religion and intellectual freedom 
centers on how one understands the practice of reading and its effects on the reader.  It begins a 
review of previous literature and discussion on religion and intellectual freedom.  It then offers a 
brief history of reading in a religious context and an overview of the connection between 
religious reading and positive or negative reading effects.  The chapter then shifts to the modern 
era to discuss the development of an agnostic view toward reading effects which informs 
practices in contemporary librarianship.   Finally, the chapter presents a conceptualization of 
religion based in a concept of “process of valuation” and a definition of intellectual freedom 
rooted in social justice.  Overall, the chapter argues that because librarians can afford to be 
agnostic on the issue of the effects of reading, they are empowered to take a broader view of both 
religion and intellectual freedom.  With these less limiting definitions in mind, it is easier for 
librarians and other information professionals to fulfill their professional duty to provide the best 




Previous Literature  
 Although there are many reference works concerning the censorship of individual works 
for religious reasons, there is little scholarly literature on intellectual freedom and religion. This 
might be true for several reasons but one of the primary ones seems to be related to the difficulty 
of defining “religion.” Religion is a broad term and, as noted above, it can mean different things 
to different people.  As Ann Taves noted in her 2010 presidential address to the American 
Academy of Religion, it is both difficult to specify as an object of study and a difficult area in 
which to formulate means to study (Taves 2011). The category covers theistic and non-theistic 
religions, animistic and organized religions, as well as broader social movements (e.g., Marxism 
as religion).  It is also possible that the so-called secularization thesis, which holds that the 
modern world is continually becoming less religious, is also related to the lack of literature on 
the topic of intellectual freedom and religion. That is, it might be that as religion is perceived to 
be a less potent social force in our society, there is less interest in studying its influence within 
the academy. Although the rise of evangelical and fundamentalist movements in the later 20
th
 
century reduced general acceptance of this theory (Riesebrodt 1998), it is possible that its 
influence reduced the amount of research on intellectual freedom and religion.  Finally, there 
also seems to be a stronger association between religion and censorship but not between religion 
and intellectual freedom.  As demonstrated in the examples above, there seems to be an overall 
view that religions are focused on abridging intellectual freedom through the censorship of 
materials. 
 One article that exemplifies this viewpoint discusses the relationship between 
Catholicism and censorship.  Ted G. Jelen argues that the Roman Catholic Church’s position on 
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intellectual freedom has remained unchanged over time and is linked to the Church’s overall 
view of itself as a teacher to its members (Jelen 1996).  This is in direct contrast with what Jelen 
calls the classical liberal viewpoint of John Stuart Mill on which much of modern society bases 
its view of intellectual freedom.  This viewpoint stresses liberty without constraint as long as it 
does not harm other people. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, rests its views of 
intellectual liberty on three pillars: first, that objective truth exists; second, that scripture is vital 
but is not the final source of authority for correct living; and, finally, on the long tradition of 
natural law.  In light of this, the Catholic tradition is very suspicious of individual reason.  If one 
follows one’s own reason one is, for all intents and purposes, obeying the demands of the flesh 
rather than the spirit.  The Church does not want to remove all books but provide guidance on 
what books/media are best for the soul.  Jelen bluntly states the “Roman Catholic Church is not 
committed to intellectual freedom as that term is conventionally understood” (Jelen 1996, 48).  
The church is instead focused on teaching people to live responsibly within the strictures of 
natural law. 
 Note that this is the conceptualization that many bring with them to the topic of religion 
and intellectual freedom.  That is, since religion is focused on living a correct life, it cannot—by 
definition—be committed to the possibility of intellectual liberty. This conceptualization, 
however, is based in a very narrow understanding of religion. Although the Roman Catholic 
Church as an institution may not be dedicated to intellectual freedom, this has little bearing on 
individual Catholics, the wider Western world, or other religious traditions.  The conflation of 
the idea of “religion” with the “Church” or “fundamentalist Christians” or “Muslims” is one of 
the issues that increases the difficulty in reconciling religion and intellectual freedom.  
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 In 2000, Indiana Libraries wrestled with the question of religion and intellectual 
freedom.  Doug Archer’s article on the topic is one of the few works to look at the topic from a 
positive point of view about religion (Archer 2000). Archer begins by noting that religion and 
intellectual freedom come from common philosophical and theological starting points and need 
not be in conflict with one another.  Archer offers three possible reasons for this.  First, religion 
is not monolithic category.  There are, to paraphrase William James, varieties of religious 
experience and diverse viewpoints mean that there is a multiplicity of standpoints regarding 
questions of intellectual freedom.  Second, Archer notes that the freedoms given in the First 
Amendment to the Constitution are rooted in the Reformation.   Through a fairly detailed 
exploration of the history of Baptists and Anabaptists, Archer makes a case for the foundations 
of intellectual freedom as having roots in established religions.  Clashes between various 
Reformist sects led, somewhat paradoxically, to the disestablishment of religion.  “People argued 
for the right to hold a variety of beliefs and to print and circulate those beliefs.  Diversity had 
become the rule rather than the exception” (Archer 2000, para. 10).  This crucial point leads to 
the third reason for harmony between religion and intellectual freedom—both are rooted in the 
“soil of personal liberty.”  Although many Reformers wished for “religious freedom for me and 
not for thee,” this attitude gradually shifted to one in which religious belief became part of an 
overall free market of ideas.  “By the insight that religious wars had not, could not and should 
not settle the truth, and by the practical act of constitutionally removing the right of any one 
viewpoint, be it religious or political to official status, freedom for all was guaranteed” (Archer 
2000, para. 13). Since there was no established religion, the marketplace of ideas—including 
religious ideas—became the law of the land. 
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 Archer continues with a discussion of differing definitions of religion and ends by stating 
that librarians should view religion as “an inextricable element in human society” (Archer 2000, 
para. 18) noting that information professionals must be sure to remember that people, including 
religious people, have the right to advocate for any views they wish even if others disagree.  
Most importantly Archer states that librarians should see the religious community as an 
“opportunity for service” and not a professional roadblock. 
 There are two responses to Archer’s article in the Indiana Libraries issue.  The first is 
from Christian Pupont who argues that part of the issue with religious freedom centers on the 
semantics of the term “freedom.”  Religious ideas concerning freedom indicate that “believers do 
not simply claim that they have certain freedoms, but rather that they are free” (Pupont 2000, 
para. 2).  He advocates instead for using the term “liberty” instead of “freedom.”  Liberty “better 
denotes the passive state of being able to act without fear of repression” (Pupont 2000, para. 3).  
This is discussed in more detail below. 
 The second response is from Barbara Luebke who describes some of the problems 
concerning intellectual freedom and religion in her small town in Indiana.  She views religious 
censorship, particularly in the form of challenges to what is perceived to be unsuitable material  
and the use of internet filters in the library, as essentially a community issue.  Those who move 
to her community because of its conservative character are surprised to find that the community 
is more heterogeneous than they expected.  Most complaints come from this group, who are 
“very vocal about what they believe should be acceptable for everyone” (Luebke 2000, para. 2).  
Luebke ends by emphasizing policy and its importance for making all people feel that they have 
a chance to explain their own viewpoints.  
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 In 2005 the Office for Intellectual Freedom Round Table of the American Librarian 
Association addressed the issue of religion and intellectual freedom in a sponsored program on 
the subject at the ALA Annual Conference.  The speakers addressed two questions.  First, “how 
can libraries serve both the religious and secular demands made by members of their 
communities?  Second: Does demonstrating respect for religious life conflict with the separation 
of church and state.  There were four respondents to the question. Each of their arguments is 
briefly described below.    
 Martin Marty began by addressing the growing controversial nature of religion in the 
U.S.  He offers four seminal quotations on this topic.  The first is from George Santayna who, in 
the early part of the 20
th
 century, addressed the question of intellectual freedom (though not by 
using that term) through the lens of religious liberty. Santayana noted that religious liberty for all 
comes with a lack of certainty that is the basis for intellectual freedom.  An agreement among 
those who were religious skeptics and those who were fervent believers laid the foundations for 
the first amendment freedoms found in the U.S. Constitution.  In particular, Marty points to 
religious fervor of Anne Hutchinson on the one hand followed by Thomas Jefferson’s skepticism 
on the other. This argument is similar to the one given by Archer described above. 
 Marty then focuses on Hannah Arendt and the importance of religious diversity to civil 
society.  He states Arendt’s thesis as follows: “if a society [has] one religion, they’ll kill 
everybody else; if it has two they’ll kill each other.  Look at the map today, anywhere you’d like, 
if you have more [than two religions], they have to find a way and freedoms come with that” 
(Office for Intellectual Freedom 2005, 271). Marty is concerned that the polarization of the U.S. 
population is leading to a lessening of freedoms.  He describes these poles as the “aggressively 
religious and the aggressively nonreligious” (Office for Intellectual Freedom 2005, 272).  Marty 
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offers four possible explanations for these changes: First, the end of Communism, millennialism 
and other movements led to a certain kind of unrootedness for many individuals.  Second, he 
notes that the marketplace of ideas is working hard to fill this vacuum.  Third, we have become a 
more individualist and less communitarian society.  Finally, technology allows those who have 
previously not had a seat at the table to gain a voice.  
 Similarly to Luebke above, Marty argues that many religious controversies are nativist 
expressions.  The campaign to put the 10 Commandments in courthouse is “not about religion at 
all, it’s about who belongs here and who doesn’t” (Office for Intellectual Freedom 2005, 308).  
Finally, Marty argues that librarians must work to make others aware that all arguments, both 
religious and nonreligious, have ideological underpinnings.  
 The second speaker at the forum was Susan Jacoby, an independent scholar whose 
remarks will be discussed in more detail below. The third speaker was a Pentecostal pastor and 
librarian, Mike Wessells, who argued that libraries should collect a wide array of opinions in 
their collections.  He stated that “in order to affirm everyone, we have to be able to be offensive 
to everyone in some fashion, and it’s important to remember that we also have to be offensive to 
ourselves” (Office for Intellectual Freedom 2005, 312).  The final speaker was Doug Archer 
whose argument is given above. At the presentation he also offered a few practical tips for 
librarians trying to be inclusive in their collection development policies. 
 To return to Jacoby, she noted that “libraries are in no way responsible for what any 
reader takes away from a book” and librarians should focuses on providing good reading 
material on not on “meeting religious demands of their community” (Office for Intellectual 
Freedom 2005, 309). She is particularly concerned with the issue of “demonstrating respect” to 
religious voices.  Jacoby describes some religions as insular and notes that these will inevitably 
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be “undermined”  by the mission of the library.  Since the library attempts to make all 
information accessible, it cannot help but make information available that is at odds with these 
religions.   
 Jacoby argues that the act of reading has consequences and it is because of these 
consequences that people attempt to censor books. She looks back at the Roman censor and then 
discusses her own brushes with religious censors.  Her own magazine, Free Inquiry, which has a 
distinctly new atheist bent, was censored by a local library in New Jersey which refused to 
accept a gift subscription to the magazine because it did not fit with the “values of the 
community.”  She ends by noting that libraries should collect books that will not be easy to read.  
It is not the library’s place to make sure that all reading materials contained within it are simple 
and easy to digest.  This means that, inevitably, that they will be offensive to religious readers. 
These two combined issues—that libraries are not responsible for how readers interpret a book 
and that reading has consequences—are discussed in more detail in the next section. 
 
Religious Reading and Reading Effects 
The concept of reading effects can be traced directly to particular ideas of religious 
reading that can be found in the history of reading practices.  For example according to common 
sources, in the Middle Ages, although many people could not read, those who could often did so 
for religious purposes (Lyons 2010).  Religious reading was seen as a path to redemption.   
During the early modern era, the doctrine of sola scriptura (by scripture alone) led followers of 
Reformation leaders to read the Bible for themselves in search of salvation.  Scholars note that 
among Reformers, although they argued that the Bible was a simple text to understand, there was 
pervasive fear that certain interpretations of scripture might lead to heresy (Gilmont 2003).  
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What is most important here is that reading was understood to be a practice with consequences 
for individuals.  Although the formulations of this fear changed over time, few argue that reading 
has no effects on the character or behavior of the reader. 
 The idea that reading can have effects is one of the reasons why one might choose not to 
support intellectual freedom. A traditional view of reading holds that reading “good” books is a 
best because it will lead to good outcomes in the individual.  For example, during debates in the 
late 18
th
 and early 19
th
 century over the so-called “fiction question” and throughout the public 
library movements dogma of “social improvement,” librarians held the view that the general 
public should be indoctrinated to read “quality” books (Garrison 2003).  Reading “bad” books 
would have a detrimental effect on both individual moral character and the democratic nature of 
society.  
 A few examples of this viewpoint come from articles from the Library Quarterly, 
published by the Graduate Library School of the University of Chicago in the 1930s and ‘40s.  
One example is Douglas Waples’s article “On Developing Taste in Reading” which argues that 
there are both “meritorious” and “meretricious” types of reading and taste has little to do with 
what people like to read (Waples 1942).  Another is William Stanley Hoole’s 1938 article, a 
course in recreational reading, which was intended to provide “close contacts with books which 
lead to broader cultural improvement” (Hoole 1938, 2). Even earlier, in 1931, A.H. Starke 
explicitly stated that there is a marked “influence of reading on character” (Starke 1931, 180).  
Although there was quite a bit of research in the area of reading effects early in the first 
half of the 20
th
 century, such research fell out of favor later in the century probably due to 
shifting attitudes towards paternalism in the public sphere as well as the adoption of the Library 
Bill of Rights.  This latter document states that “materials should not be excluded because of the 
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origin, background, or views of those contributing to their creation” and “should not be 
proscribed or removed because of partisan or doctrinal disapproval” (American Library 
Association 1996).  Wayne Wiegand argues that librarianship found support for intellectual 
freedom a more fruitful area of research than studying reading habits and outcomes (Wiegand 
1999). 
 Another influence upon reading research can be found in what might be called a 
modernist view of reading effects which developed in the 1970s.  This viewpoint was most 
clearly articulated by Jesse Shera in his monograph Introduction to Library Science in which he 
writes that “because we do not know, with any precision, ‘what reading does to people,’ or how 
it affects social behavior the profession can be magnanimous in admitting to library shelves 
books that present all sides of a subject” (Shera 1976, 56).  Modern librarianship does not argue 
that there are no effects when one reads a particular text but that there is no way of knowing 
what those effects might be.  Agnosticism toward the effects of reading and knowledge might be 
understood as one of the primary epistemological positions of modern librarianship.  This 
conceptualization of reading also allows modern librarians and information professionals to 
provide a variety of viewpoints regarding a particular subject, including religion, on their 
shelves.    
 
Religion and Religiosity: An Expanded Definition 
 When one thinks of “religion,” what comes to mind? One might think of a figure like Pat 
Robertson of the 700 Club or James Dobson of Focus on the Family who embody a particular 
type of Evangelical Christianity. Others might think of the Tenzing Gyatso considered by 
Tibetan Buddhists to be the 14
th
 incarnation of the Dalai Lama. For many in the United States, 
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“religion” might have a political dimension associated with the Christian Right and their many 
social campaigns. Other images that might come to mind include churches, shrines, crosses, 
headscarves and other material of religious observance.  
There is often a “public” aspect to these conceptualizations of religion.  Religious people 
display their religion by discussing what they believe.  In many cases, being religious also has a  
theistic cast involving a belief in an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent higher being or at 
the very least in a transcendent “higher power.” Religious people “do things” and/or “believe 
things.” Religion is also strongly associated with values and practices that may be in conflict 
with modern secular society.  
These formulations all have several things in common.  First, they are images of 
organized religion often associated with the five major religions.  Second, these ideas of religion 
do not include people who are agnostic or atheist.  Third, they incorporate a narrow definition of 
religion that focuses on public actions. They are all somewhat limited conceptualizations of 
religion that would, in turn, have strong implications for whether or not religious people support 
intellectual freedom.  That is, if one thinks of being religious in these ways, then how could a 
religious person be open to other ideas?  How can one respect the free speech of others?  
 As discussed above, although one might have a general idea of what religion is in a 
decidedly “I know it when I see it” kind of way, religion is, in fact, notoriously difficult to 
define.  In the most recent Encyclopedia of Religion, Gregory D. Alles states that it is difficult to 
“denote religious experience in a way that is not obscure…or circular” (Alles 2005, 7701). Since 
its establishment as an area of academic study in the late 19
th
 century, there have been many 
efforts to define just what “religion” is.  This section of the article does not attempt to discuss all 
of the many definitions given over time or even give its own definition of religion; instead, this 
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section will provide the reader with some sense as to why religion is contested in the hopes of 
broadening the conceptualizations of religion given above.  
 Alles article provides a good starting point for understanding why the concept of 
“religion” is not stable. He begins with an overview of Ernst Feil’s three meanings of the term 
starting with religion as a collection of moral behaviors that are directed to spiritual beings, then 
religion as “an intuition of the universe as a whole and of oneself as a part of it” and, finally, 
religion as faith (Alles 2005, 7702). Alles then discusses strategies that scholars have used to 
define religion.  For example, there are scholars of religion who focus on how religion functions; 
that is, they “describe what religions do.”  Other scholars employ Wittgenstein’s idea of “family 
resemblances” among religions while others focus on religion as prototype.  This final category 
is probably most familiar to many non-scholars in that religions are often classified based on 
how much they resemble one’s own understanding of religion.  As Alles states, “for North 
American and European scholars, religion is a category whose prototypes are Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam, perhaps not in that order.  Other religions are religions to the extent that 
they are more or less analogous to these prototypes” (Alles 2005, 7704). One could argue that the 
definitions of religion given above fall into this category of using a prototype for classification.    
 In her presidential address to the American Academy of Religion, Ann Taves also 
focused on the definition of religion as an object of study within the academy. She argues that 
rather than thinking of a religion as a “thing” one should consider religion to be a process, 
specifically a process of valuation. The term “valuation” refers to “things that matter”: 
What we as scholars think of as religions, philosophies, paths…etc., could be construed 
as more or less formalized, more or less coherent systems of valuation that people call 
upon consciously and unconsciously when making claims regarding what happened, what 
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caused it, and whether or why it matters. They are not, however, the only systems of 
valuation and may be drawn upon by some but not all participants in an action or event. 
Nor are highly elaborated, formalized, and coherent systems required for people to make 
such judgments. Indeed, I would suggest that the more formalized and coherent systems 
stand in explicit tension with less coherent, but more pragmatic, more automatic, 
seemingly intuitive processes of valuation (Taves 2011, 292). 
Here religion is a process of making judgments regarding life events. This definition pulls 
religion out of the realm of the how humans relate to the mystical, spiritual, occult, and 
supernatural and into the domain of focusing on how individuals understand particular 
happenings in their lives.   
 For the purposes of conceptualizing the relationship between religion and intellectual 
freedom, this definition is helpful because it moves religion from simply a domain of “doing 
things” and/or “believing things” into something more dynamic.  If religion is a “process of 
valuation” rather than a series of proscriptions and demands, one can more clearly see why it is 
important to provide access to information that will aide this process.  
 Although the conceptualization of religion as a “process of valuation” provides a broader 
starting point for understanding religion, it is still somewhat abstract.  In light of this, it is helpful 
to consider the varied ways in which people actually live out this process.  Here we turn to social 
science and the measurements that are used to identify the religiosity and spirituality of a 
particular individual or population.   
 One of the most popular of these models is the Fetzer multidimensional measure which is 
used by many scholars and practitioners (Neff 2006). Developed by a group of scholars  to study 
various dimensions of religion and spirituality, the Fetzer measure is composed of 12 dimensions 
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of spirituality and religion (Fetzer Institute and National Institute on Aging 1999).  These 12 
domains are as follows: Daily Spiritual Experiences, Meaning, Values, Beliefs, Forgiveness, 
Private Religious Practices, Religious/Spiritual Coping, Religious Support, Religious/Spiritual 
History, Commitment, Organizational Religiousness, and Religious Preferences.   These 
dimensions cover a wide-range of concepts that might be included in the “process of valuation.” 
 Items in the measurement run the gamut from “I ask for God’s help in the midst of daily 
activities” to “I think about how my life is part of a larger spiritual force.”  Note that almost all 
of the questions are answered using a Likert-scale.  That is, it is possible to state that “ ‘I feel 
God’s presence’ 1 - Many times a day; 2 - Every day; 3 - Most days; 4 - Some days; 5 - Once in 
a while;6 - Never or almost never” (Fetzer Institute and National Institute on Aging 1999, 15)  It 
is the dimensionality of this measure that is of particular interest here.  One might think of 
religion as an all or nothing proposition—one either believes or one does not.  However, the 
array of questions and answers in the Fetzer Measure demonstrate that lived religion and 
spirituality is rarely static. When thinking of religion in relation to intellectual freedom it is 
important to consider both the process of valuation and all of the dimensions that encompass 
religious and spiritual life. 
 
Intellectual Freedom and Social Justice 
In the United States, intellectual freedom is strongly associated with first amendment of 
the Constitution. The amendment which states “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances” provides the legal basis for freedom of both speech and 
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religion in the United States.  Although there are categories of speech that are not protected, 
American citizens are generally allowed to engage in a speech that is not incitement, libel, or 
slander.  The concept of intellect freedom flows from this right but is somewhat broader.   
The term conveys the idea that individuals are free to believe in, share, and have access to 
any intellectual materials.   The Intellectual Freedom Manual, for example, defines the term as 
follows: “intellectual freedom accords to all library users the right to seek and receive 
information on all subjects from all points of view without restriction and without having the 
subject of one’s interest examined or scrutinized by others” (American Library Association 
2010, 3).   Supporting intellectual freedom means that one is against censorship. This means that 
someone who supports intellectual freedom is, by definition, against religious challenges against 
material described above. 
It is more helpful to define intellectual freedom as a right to access the whole of the 
information universe without fear of reprisal from social, institutional, or governmental powers.    
This definition is rooted in ideas of “liberty” rather than “freedom.”  As noted above, liberty 
denotes a state of independence from oppression—one has the agency to seek whatever 
information one wishes. This definition approaches intellectual freedom as a social justice issue 
and is based on the work of Peter Lor and Johannes Britz, who use philosopher John Rawls’ 
theory of justice to support their view that knowledge societies must have freedom of access to 
information (Lor & Britz, 2007).Their thesis states that knowledge societies cannot exist without 
freedom of access to information.  The authors use their own country, South Africa, as an 
example in order to demonstrate how lack of access to information can have deleterious effects 
on a society.  “Our experience in South Africa during the apartheid years,” the authors write, 
“taught us that restrictions on access can cause a regime to lose touch with reality. Curtailment of 
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freedom of information is invariably associated with the dissemination of disinformation” (Lor & 
Britz, 2007, 394).  Lor and Britz describe four pillars of information societies (information and 
communication technology infrastructure, usable content, human intellectual capacity, and 
physical delivery infrastructure) which cannot be brought to fruition without access to 
information.  It is the third pillar—human intellectual capacity—that relates directly to religion 
and intellectual freedom.  
 
Conclusion 
 The relationship between religion and intellectual freedom is difficult to 
articulate.  At first glance, they seem to be opposing domains. If the original conceptualizations 
of religion and intellectual freedom given above are used, adhering to a particular religion 
means, by definition, that one does not support access to any and all information.  This article 
argued for a broad understanding of religion to mitigate the oppositional stance between religion 
and intellectual freedom. 
In library and information science it is imperative that, instead of focusing on religion as 
a negative domain when it comes to intellectual freedom, we focus on the human intellectual 
capacity for the process of valuation and the multiple dimensions of religiosity and spirituality.  
Although librarians’ interactions with “religious” people who challenge materials in collections 
might be of the negative variety, librarians and other information professionals must recall that 
we are there to serve all members of our communities including both those who are certain of 
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